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In his eminently readable and concise new book, Profess r Landy has made an important con-
tribution to the increasingly substantial field of literary criticism devoted to theorizing the 
relationship between ethics and literature. Now enteri g its second generation, the theoretical 
movement sometimes called »the ethical turn« remains vibrant, and How to Do Things with 
Fictions will merit a place alongside Martha Nussbaum’s Love’s Knowledge and J. Hillis 
Miller’s The Ethics of Reading as one of the central texts in this field.1 Landy admirably mas-
ters a massive body of criticism – approximately a third of the book is devoted to footnotes – 
and carefully distinguishes his notion that fiction can be »formative« from a number of poten-
tial alternatives. 
 
He does so especially in the book’s first two chapters – the first a theoretical introduction, the 
second an analysis of Chaucer’s »The Nun’s Priest’s Tale« – provocatively arguing that »It is 
time, I submit, to reclaim fiction from the meaning-mongers« (8). Landy means here a certain 
default assumption about how one ought to go about engaging literary texts, exemplified by 
an undergraduate student who, upon reading Toni Morrison’s Song of Solomon, expressed 
frustration that Morrison took so long to get to the point (cf. 1). This attitude, which Landy 
terms reading for »the message« or for »propositional content« (ibid.) is in his diagnosis per-
nicious, with negative effects on critics, writers, and readers (cf. 8). Against this view, he 
seeks to develop an account of the »pragmatics«, intead of the »semantics«, of literature; as 
he puts it, we could cease »to talk about what a text ›says‹ – if indeed there is such a thing – 
and [begin] to talk again about what it does« (9, emphasis in original). But in developing this 
view, Landy emphasizes that we need to pay as much attention to what readers want from the 
texts as what the texts offer: marking out a distinction between his account and Nussbaum’s, 
he explains that readers must want to be developed in a certain way by a text for it to effec-
tively do so. »The Nun’s Priest’s Tale«, which tells the story of a rooster who ignores a dream 
that he will be caught by a fox, only to escape from a fox the very next day through the fox’s 
arrogance (after being caught precisely because of his own pride), serves Landy well here. He 
persuasively argues that the story might serve as a parable for the dangers of conceit, but just 
as well might serve as a parable for the portentous power of dreams – and whichever moral 
the reader accepts depends not on the story, but on what the reader already believes plausible 
(cf. 25). Similarly, while he is content to agree with Nussbaum that fictions can develop our 
capacity for moral attention, he insists that this w ll only occur if readers are »predisposed to 
moral improvement«, and inclined to »come to the text for that« (38f., emphasis in original). 
 
As an alternative, Landy develops an account of what he calls »formative fictions« (10). Such 
works do not offer us propositional knowledge, but rather serve as training exercises for cer-
tain specific capacities: »rather than providing knowledge per se«, what such texts »give us is 
know-how […] what they equip us with are skills« (ibid.). And in the book’s four main chap-
ters – on the Book of Mark, Stéphane Mallarmé, Plato, nd Samuel Beckett, respectively – 
Landy goes on to show how the formal features of the texts serve not to convey a set of 
propositions, but rather to appeal to and subsequently develop a certain faculty on the part of 
the reader. Cleverly, Landy shows how the formative function depends precisely on the reader 
looking past the actual propositional content of the literary text. 
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Thus, for instance, he notes the peculiar fact that despite the common notion that Jesus used 
parables to make his meaning clear, Christ’s parables in the Book of Mark often serve pre-
cisely to confuse the point – and indeed, the reactions to the parables in Mark’s description 
are often confusion, as the disciples are often »completely at a loss« (47). The problem is that 
such people are trying to understand the parables in propositional terms, when they are in fact 
deliberately obscure: Landy emphasizes the surprising fact that Christ himself says he speaks 
»so that they [the listeners] may […] hear but not understand; lest they should turn again, and 
be forgiven«, which is to say that parables function precisely to »prevent people from under-
standing them« (ibid.). The right reaction, which is possible only from the few people who 
have a certain capacity, is found in the parable of the »Syrophoenician Woman«, who cru-
cially answers an obscure metaphor from Christ with another metaphor. Put succinctly, the 
right reaction is not translation but production – amely, of figurative language. This leads to 
Landy’s depiction of a »formative circle«, which is structured to parallel the hermeneutic cir-
cle: readers have a certain capacity – to speak figuratively, for example – and the formative 
text affects them by developing it. And if in the Book of Mark there is a connection between 
this capacity and spiritual affinity, Landy provocatively suggests that there might be some-
thing of secular value in the notion of a »figurative state of mind«. 
 
The book is at its best generally in its patient and scrupulously documented explanation of 
how tortured critical interpretations can become when they insist on reading for a coherent 
propositional content, and how simply and easily the formative account can explain the com-
plexities such interpretations cannot acknowledge. Of course this emerges first in the reading 
of Mark, where Landy takes some pains to acknowledge and refute the long tradition that in-
sists Jesus Christ wanted to be understood, but a similarly impressive example is his discus-
sion of Plato. Landy notes Socrates’s famous argument that no man can willingly pursue what 
he believes to be bad, but then calls our attention to the way Plato depicts people doing pre-
cisely this – in the case of the Symposium, Alcibiades, who in a final speech claims that Soc-
rates makes him realize the worthlessness of his »political career«, but then can’t bring him-
self to give it up (98). He then develops a provocative reading emphasizing not Socrates’s 
coherence – he painstakingly demonstrates the failures of readings that attempt to synthesize 
Socrates’s statements – but precisely Socrates’s failures. In this way, Landy suggests, Plato is 
ironic: the reader is meant to recognize in characte s like Alcibiades examples that contradict 
Socrates’s own psychological theory. And thus we miss the invitation Plato offers when we 
try to read the texts coherently; what they rather ask us to do is disagree with Socrates pre-
cisely the way he disagrees with others. Thus, the text does not teach us – indeed, we will get 
it wrong if we require it to do so. Rather, it trains us in a particular kind of discourse. And this 
way of reading Plato explains precisely why his dialogues are so complicated and contradic-
tory in the first place. 
 
There are a number of theoretical virtues to Landy’s approach. It is first of all admirably lo-
calized: Landy admits that not every text is a formative fiction. And as he persuasively notes, 
this humility in claiming to only explain certain literary texts rather than the literary as such is 
a virtue rather than a weakness (cf. 17). Second, as Landy again emphasizes, this account can 
explain why readers might re-read a text, since they ar  being trained by it; this is in contrast 
to the »propositional content theory«, which cannot explain why readers might return to a text 
whose message they have mastered (14). Finally, Landy can address perhaps the central prob-
lem in thinking about ethics and literature – namely, why reading books doesn’t always make 
people better. After all, for Landy, books operate formatively only on those readers prepared 
for them to do so. 
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Alongside these strengths, however, there are some genuine problems. First, Landy’s account 
of the current state of the field and his positioning of his argument within it is importantly 
incomplete. The book opens with an impressive chart of theorists who have addressed the 
benefits of reading fiction, whom Landy sorts into three primary categories and thirteen total 
ways of »looking at a fiction«. What is confusing about this list is that it is neither of Landy’s 
enemies nor precisely his allies, but rather something like alternatives to his view; he counts 
»over a dozen non-message-based theories« (6). The position that needs the most explanation 
– the reader who attends to propositional content, or the »meaning-monger« whom Landy will 
criticize throughout the book – receives surprisingly short shrift: two footnotes refer briefly to 
mid-twentieth-century figures like Jean-Paul Sartre, Ian Watt, Iris Murdoch, and a few others 
(cf. 153). Rather than substantively grounding the view in a charitably represented critical 
opponent, Landy speaks of this reading strategy as the one »currently being taught in high 
schools« and »evaluated in the public domain« (8); his citation for these claims refers to Jen-
nifer Lopez’s speech at the 2006 Academy Awards (cf. 153). Similarly, he suggests that there 
is a »contemporary cultural bias« that decrees »every book« as »valuable for its message« 
(120). Given, however, his opening categorization, which demonstrates the flowering of theo-
ries of fiction that do not emphasize the way it conveys a message, it is difficult to agree with 
Landy’s broad generalization that this is what most readers are up to: certainly in the critical 
academy Landy taxonomizes, much the opposite would appear to be true. 
 
The problem is made more noticeable by Landy’s failure to engage much of the secondary 
criticism on the ethical turn. The point at the center of Landy’s argument, that critics need to 
stop reading for the message of literary texts, is one that has been made before, and made in 
this particular debate: Adam Zachary Newton developd his »narrative ethics« in contrast to 
theories that emphasize the »translated meaning of the literary text«; Simon Haines has criti-
cized philosophers who read such texts for their »reformulable ideas«; and David Parker 
wrote recently that the ethical value of literature does not lie »in ethical propositions that can 
be gleaned from it«.2 This is to say shortly that literature has already been rescued from the 
meaning-mongers, and there is no need to do it again. L ndy’s approach may be new – in-
deed, I think it is – but the problem that drove him to it, which is his sense that unsophisti-
cated critics were reading for messages rather than form, is one that theorists have been think-
ing about for some time. And rather than situating his account against philosophers like 
Heidegger and Hegel (who receive a place in his categories) it would be clearer what was new 
about Landy’s approach if he had distinguished it from that of other participants in the ethical 
turn, authors like Newton and Parker. 
 
And as a theoretical matter, Landy’s central concept of the »formative« appears vulnerable to 
some of the objections he presses against his rivals. For instance, in arguing against the notion 
that literary texts reliably develop the moral abilities of their readers, he relies on the fact that 
there is »only shaky empirical evidence that well-intentioned art actually makes a difference 
in how people act« (33). But it seems to me that Landy’s account similarly relies on dubious 
empirical claims: for instance, in describing the formative circle, he has to posit that there is a 
mental faculty for generating figurative language, and that it can reliably be improved by 
reading certain texts (A footnote gestures at this problem without solving it: Landy says he is 
»leaving open« the way analyses of the brain would un erstand such a faculty, and refers to 
one 1978 psychology paper on »metaphoric competence« as an example of the sort of study 
needed rather than as one supporting his more specific claim; see 173 n. 68). The problem is 
complicated by the fact that the »capacities« the development of which Landy analyzes in his 
four chapters are not parallel entities. As I understand it, they are our capacity for generating 
figurative language (Mark), our capacity to engage in a willful self-delusion that re-enchants 
the world (Mallarmé), our ability to understand the inconsistencies in a theoretical position 
 4 
(Plato), and our desire for a certain kind of philosophical self-contentedness (Beckett). Since 
these are not obviously the same sort of psychological items, empirical verification for any 
one – suppose for example that reading Plato with an eye towards irony really did make one 
more capable of seeing tensions in philosophical views and ways to resolve them – would 
suggest little about the relationship between literary texts and the other capacities. 
 
And finally, it is not quite clear why, if it is training in these capacities one wants, close read-
ing of literature is the thing most worth doing. Professor Landy’s argument offers an excellent 
reason why reading literature is preferable to reading iscursive, propositional treatments of 
the relevant issues: in their difficulty, the literary texts offer »training«, instead of merely 
teaching (19). But what is not clear is why training through literature is preferable to other 
forms of training, period. The problem here is most di cernible vis-à-vis the example of Plato: 
it seems to me we could concede to Landy that Plato’s texts train readers in the ability to »lo-
cate holes in an argument« (118), and yet hold that if this was the primary reason to read 
Plato, one had much better spend the time actually talking with a philosopher, who could no-
tice the strengths and weaknesses of a given student in this area and respond accordingly 
much more easily than Plato could. In other words, if Landy is right that what we want is 
training, it is not clear to me that this results in much reason to read literature at all. 
 
So for these reasons, I do not think that the book is quite successful in achieving its aims. But 
its intervention in these debates is nevertheless one that cannot be ignored, and deserves credit 
for moving the broader arguments a good distance forward. I am eager to see how Professor 
Landy’s thinking about these matters develops. 
 
Patrick Fessenbecker 
Johns Hopkins University 
Department of English 
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